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Character Evidence in Illinois: Dissipating the Mist?
[Evidence] of good character is to be used like any other, once
it gets before the jury, and the less they are told about the grounds
for its admission, or what they shall do with it, the more likely they
are to use it sensibly. The subject seems to gather mist which
discussion serves only to thicken, and which we can scarcely hope
to dissipate by anything further we can add.'
JUDGE LEARNED HAND

INTRODUCTION

The function of the jury in the American legal system is frequently described as being that of a "trier of fact."' A critical factor
in the outcome of any lawsuit is the jury's perception and evaluation
of the demeanor, credibility and character of the participants. In the
context of the litigation process, the word "character" is a shorthand expression for who and what a person is, predicated on that
person's external manifestations of personality traits, such as virtues, habits, values, and prejudices.' Arguably, these traits can be
reliable barometers for predicting or explaining conduct., The presentation of evidence of such traits at trial, however, may pose relevancy hazards, since prejudice, confusion, and time consumption
frequently outweigh the probative value of such evidence. Nonetheless, there are a variety of situations in which the judicial process
allows evidence of character to be introduced to supplement the
observational powers of the jury.
The common law rules governing who may present evidence of
character, when, for what prupose, and in what manner, are the
result of a careful balancing of the relevancy factors by common law
courts over hundreds of years of adjudication. This ad hoc winnowing process has culminated in a welter of complex standards subject
to misinterpretation and misapplication by American courts, including those of Illinois.' The enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence simplified and clarified this area of the law, and provided
the benchmark for the character evidence standards formulated by
1. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006-07 (2d Cir. 1932).
2. Of course, judges also act as triers of fact in bench trials. This article, however, will
concentrate on the situation where the jury is the sole trier of fact.
3. Ladd, Techniques and Theory of CharacterTestimony, 24 IOWA L. REv. 498, 506 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as Ladd].
4. Id. at 506.
5. See generally 7 J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE §§1981-86 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE (3d ed.)].
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the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Evidence ', in
proposed Illinois rules of evidence 404, 7 405,- 608,1 and 609.' Generally, the federal and proposed Illinois rules codify the common law
character evidence rules, and address the situations in which the
judicial process allows evidence of character to be introduced.
Modern Illinois common law provisions are in general accord with
the rules governing character evidence in the majority of state jurisdictions. This article will examine the major categories and policies
of the common law of character evidence, delineate variations in
Illinois law, and evaluate the potential impact of models for change,
such as the Proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence and the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
SUBSTANTIVE USE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE

There are two principal categories and uses of character evidence.
Character evidence may be employed either in a substantive fashion, to prove or disprove a factual issue, or for impeachment purposes, to attack or support the credibility of a witness. Where evidence of character is offered substantively, character itself may be
an ultimate issue in the case. For example, in an action against an
employer based on the negligent hiring of an incompetent employee, the character of the employee for competence and care is
necessarily "in issue" and may be proven in the same manner as
any other issue."
In a case where character is not an ultimate issue, character evidence may be circumstantially relevant to suggest that a person
with a particular propensity or trait acted in conformance with that
trait on the occasion in question.' 2 Where this circumstantial inference is the only objective behind the introduction of such evidence,
6. Compare PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608, 609 with FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608,
609. The Preface to the Proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence (Final Draft) makes it clear that
the Federal Rules served as the model for the Proposed Illinois Rules. See Preface, PROPOSED
ILL. R. EVID.* at vi-vii. (Final Draft). The focus of this article will be on Illinois common law
as it compares to the majority common law, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Proposed
Illinois Rules of Evidence. Although these groups of rules are very similar, they are not
identical; therefore, this article will also set out the differences between the various rule
systems.
7. See notes 12-53 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 30-41 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 57-86 infra and accompanying text.
i0. See notes 87-101 infra and accompanying text.
11. Western Stone Co. v. Whalen, 151 Ill. 472, 38 N.E. 241 (1894); see generally Comment,
Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: The Case Against Exclusion, 52 OR. L. Rv.
296 (1973).
12. S. SALTZBERG & F. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 404 (2d ed. 1977).
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the common law sets forth a general rule excluding character evidence. 3 The rule applies to both criminal and civil suits," and is
premised on the policy that cases should not be decided on facts
other than those directly relevant to the immediate suit.' Rule
404(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Proposed Illinois
Rules codifies the common law."6
13. Id.
14. The traditional position excludes character evidence in civil cases when offered to
imply conduct, basically for the same reasons which justify its exclusion in the criminal
situation. See generally Ladd, supra note 3, at 504-05; 1 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 5, §
64. This policy seems sound when applied in the average "non-moral" lawsuit, since character
evidence there is clearly irrelevant. Where, however, the case revolves around a "moral" trait,
there ajipears to be no good reason not to follow the pattern of the criminal rule and allow
the defendant to broach the issue of his character. For example, the present system would
allow the defendant in a criminal assault trial to introduce evidence of the victim's violent
character to bolster a plea of self-defense, but would forbid the same evidence if the victim
brought a civil suit for assault. This result has led many eminent commentators and scholars
to criticize the rule, and the policy seems likely to be subject to hot debate for many years.
Professor Falknor argues that character evidence should be admissible in a civil case to
refute a claim of criminal or immoral conduct:
My own view, then, is that if evidence of good character is able to free itself from
the claim that it comes with too much "dangerous baggage" of prejudice, distraction from the issues, time consumption, and hazard of surprise when offered for the
accused in a criminal action, there is no sufficient basis upon which to keep it out
in a civil action involving a charge of criminal conduct.
Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 574, 582-83 (1956).
The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 404 rejects the circumstantial use of character
evidence, based in part on the report of the California Law Revision Commission:
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It tends
to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on
the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man
and punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the
evidence in the case shows actually happened.
Tenative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Art. IV,
Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility), Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep., Rec. & Studies,
615 (1964). It should be noted, however, that Professor Chadbourn, as a member of the
Commission, strongly endorsed the approach of equating the treatment of character evidence
in civil and criminal actions. Id. at 657-58.
15. See Udall, CharacterProof In the Law of Evidence-A Summary 18 U. CIN. L. REv.
283, 296-97 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Udall].
16. FED. R. EviD. 404 and PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 404 (Final Draft) provide:
Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other
Crimes
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
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The circumstantial use of character evidence, and the justification for the exclusionary policy, is best demonstrated in the context
of a criminal case. The rule precludes the prosecution from introducing past misconduct by the defendant to show that he has an
"evil propensity" toward a proscribed mode of conduct, is therefore
7
a "bad person," and is thus probably guilty of the offense charged.
Evidence of prior misconduct, although arguably probative of a defendant's character propensities, is excluded to prevent confusion of
the issues, distraction of the jury from the issues, time consumption,
and prejudice to the defendant. 8 It would be fundamentally unfair
to compel a defendant who is on trial for one particular crime to
defend his entire life. 9 To avoid the substantial danger that a jury
will misuse evidence of prior bad acts, the prosecution is generally
2
forbidden to present such evidence in its case in chief.
Nevertheless, evidence of other crimes and bad acts may be properly offered for certain limited purposes, under the common law.
Federal and proposed Illinois rule 404(b) codify these exceptions.2'
Permissible purposes include proof of motive, 2 knowledge, 23 identity,24 existence of a common pattern or scheme,25' and intent. "
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as a
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
17. As Judge Cardozo said in People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 194, 172 N.E. 466, 468
(1930):
The principle back of the exclusion is one, not of logic, but of policy. . . . There
may be cogency in the argument that a quarrelsome defendant is more likely to
start an argument than one of milder type, a man of dangerous mode of life more
likely than a shy recluse. The law is not blind to this, but equally it is not blind to
the peril to the innocent if character is accepted as probative of crime.
See also 1 WIGMORE (3d ed.) supra note 5, § 194.
18. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); E. CLEARY, et al.,
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 188, at 445 (2d ed. 1972) Ihereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK (2d ed.)].
19. People v. Stanton, 1 Ill. 2d 444, 115 N.E.2d 630 (1953); 1 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE
§ 4.44, at 472 (6th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as JONES (6th ed.)].
20. See generally D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 136, at 83 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & MUELLER]; People v. Haas, 293 11. 274, 127 N.E. 740 (1920).
21. See note 16 supra for the text of rule 404(b).
22. People v. Hoover, 35 Il. App. 3d 799, 342 N.E.2d 795 (1976); see generally 1 WIGMORE
(3d ed.), supra note 5, §§ 117-19.
23. People v. Parker, 35 Il. App. 3d 870, 343 N.E.2d 52 (1976).
24. People v. Walker, 34 Ill. 2d 23, 213 N.E.2d 552 (1966); People v. Kovacivich, 10 I1.
App. 3d 797, 295 N.E.2d 33 (1973).
25. People v. Middleton, 38 Ill. App. 3d 984, 350 N.E.2d 223 (1976). See also 2 WIGMORE
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These exceptions to the general exclusionary rule create a critical
danger of prejudice to the defendant. Accordingly, McCormick and
others27 have forcefully urged courts to eschew the mechanical, pigeonholing approach to admissibility in favor of a careful balancing
of probative worth versus unfair prejudice. Such factors as the necessity of using "other crimes" evidence to prove the issues in the
immediate case, the relative strength or weakness of this evidence
in proving these issues, and the danger that the jury will be unduly
influenced by the evidence should be considered in the exercise of
judicial discretion."
Exceptions to the CharacterExclusionary Rule and Methods of

Proof
There are several major exceptions to the general common law
rule excluding the circumstantial use of character evidence. These
exceptions have been codified by the federal and proposed Illinois
evidence codes, and are set out in rule 404(a).
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of
proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3d ed.), supra note 5, §§ 300, 304, 306.
26. See generally People v. Lehman, 5 I1. 2d 337, 125 N.E.2d 506 (1955); 2 WICMORE (3d
ed.), supra note 5, §§ 300-76; MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18 § 190 at 447; LoUISELL &
MUELLER, supra note 20, § 140 at 113.
27. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 190 at 453; LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note
19, § 140 at 119.
28. See People v. Hodges, 20 Il1. App. 3d 1016, 314 N.E.2d 8 (1974). McCormick strongly
recommends that the trial judge should exercise his discretion in favor of excluding the other
crimes evidence:
[Elven when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its
probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir such
passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of guilt or
innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not only leeway but responsibility.
MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 190 at 453-54.
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(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness,
as provided in rules 607, 608 and 609.29

Character evidence deemed admissible under one of these exceptions is provable by three possible methods: testimony of specific
acts, testimony relating the personal opinion of a witness, and testimony concerning reputation. 30 Traditionally, common law in the
United States has permitted proof of character only by reputation
testimony. 3' The prohibition of testimony of personal opinion has
been criticized by such authorities as Wigmore, McCormick, and
Ladd as being an historical and practical anomaly .2 These commentators note that early common law uniformly allowed personal
opinion testimony. 3 This viewpoint was adopted by the drafters
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in federal rule 405. 31 In addition,
29. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) and PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 404(a) (Final Draft).
30. See generally MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 186 at 443.
31. Testimony about specific actions on prior occasions may be the most probative evidence of a person's actual character, but it is also the form most likely to distract, confuse,
or prejudice the jury, and is therefore inadmissible except where character is "in issue."
32. 7 WIc.MORE (3d ed.), supra note 5, §§ 1981-86. Dean Wigmore's criticism is classic:
Put any one of us on trial for a false charge, and ask him whether he would not
rather invoke in his vindication, as Lord Kenyon said, "the warm, affectionate
testimony" of those few whose long intimacy and trust have made them ready to
demonstrate their faith to the jury, than any amount of colorful assertions about
reputation. Take the place of a jury man, and speculate whether he is helped more
by the witnesses whose personal intimacy gives to their belief a first and highest
value, or by those who merely repeat a form of words in which the term reputation
occurs. Look at it from the point of view of the prosecution, and apply the principle
in such a case as R. V. Rowton (a trial for indecent assault upon a young boy, where
a prosecution witness would have testified that although he did not know the
defendant's reputation he had known the defendant when he was his teacher, and
considered him capable of 'the grossest indecency and the most flagrant immorality'), and then decide whether the witness who was there excluded was not, if
believed, worth more than forty opposing witnesses testifying to that intangible,
untestable creation called 'reputation'. The Anglo-American rules of evidence have
occasionally taken some curious twistings in the course of their development; but
they have never done anything so curious in the way of shutting out evidential light
as when they decided to exclude the person who knows as much as humanly can
be known about the character of another, and have still admitted the secondhand,
irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip which we term 'reputation.'
Id., § 1986 at 243. See also MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 191 at 456; Ladd, supra
note 3, at 509-13.
33. See, e.g., 7 WirMORE (3d ed.), supra note 5, § 1985 n. 8, where Dean Wigmore states
that early Illinois cases permitted testimony in the form of personal opinion.
34. FED. R. EVID. 405 READS:
Methods of Proving Character
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait
of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry
is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
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a majority of the states that have enacted evidence codes have
followed the federal lead in this area. 5 Illinois courts"8 and the
majority of common law jurisdictions, however, have consistently
rejected opinion evidence. 7 Although the minority report of the
Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Evidence recommended adoption of the federal position,3 8 proposed Illinois rule 405
continues the common law prohibition on opinion evidence.3 9
The rationale for allowing the admission of reputation evidence
at common law is that a person's reputation is considered to be the
product of community evaluation, arrived at after years of observation. The justification advanced for the preclusion of personal opinion has been that such testimony generates distracting crossexamination into the specific bases of the opinion, and thus raises
"innumerable collateral issues which . . .complicate and confuse
the trial, distract the minds of jurymen and befog the chief issues
in the litigation."4' Further, it is feared that a witness's personal
opinion of a defendant's character may be distorted by his own
feelings of bias or prejudice.'
The reasons advanced for excluding opinion evidence, although
apparently logical, do not withstand close analysis. First, crossexamination certainly can reveal whether an opinion that is expressed is predicated upon an unreliable foundation. Second, it is
highly doubtful that any reputation testimony can be given which
is not influenced heavily by the personal conclusions of the witness.
As a practical matter, it is obvious that a party would not call as a
witness a person who would express a judgment adverse to that
desired by the proponent. It is difficult to imagine that a jury faced
with this type of testimony would be able to separate the report of
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also
be made of specific instances of his conduct.
35. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT., Rules of Evidence, Rule 405 (Rules of Court 1978).
36. People v. Chaney, 48 Ill. App. 3d 775, 362 N.E.2d 1375 (1977).
37. McCoRMIcK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 186 at 442.
38.

39.

PROPOSED ILL. R. EviD. 405, Minority Discussion (Final Draft).

PROPOSED ILL. R. Evm. 405 (Final Draft) provides:
Methods of Proving Character
(a) Reputation. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of
a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation. On crossexamination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character
of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be
made of specific instances of his conduct.
40. People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 419, 82 N.E. 718, 721 (1907).
41. Ladd, supra note 3, at 516.
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the reputation from the opinion of the person relating that report.
In that context, the need for a legal distinction between the two
types of testimony is unnecessary.
Evidence of Defendant's Character Offered by Defendant
The major common law exception to the general rule of exclusion
is codified in federal and Illinois rule 404(a)(1). This exception allows a criminal defendant to introduce affirmative, substantive evidence of his good character to imply that he is innocent of the
charged offense. 2 The justification for allowing this means of proof
to the defendant, while precluding its initial use by the prosecution,
is to enable the defendant, particularly in a factually close case, to
raise reasonable doubt as to his guilt.4" The relevancy dangers supporting the exclusionary policy are outweighed in this situation by
the fact that the accused faces possible criminal penalties; the defendant therefore may "open the door" to evidence of his character.
The affirmative evidence of good character presented by a defendant must relate to the trait involved in the charged offense." For
example, a defendant who is charged with rape may present character witnesses to testify concerning his good character for chastity,
while testimony that he is attentive to his job and sober-minded is
rejected as irrelevant." A witness, before he may testify, must be
qualified properly through preliminary questioning. Such questioning establishes the witness's familiarity with the defendant's reputation in a "relevant social group,"" at or near the time the alleged
crime occurred.47
42. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) and PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 404 (a)(1) (Final Draft); see text
at note 16, supra. The manner and scope of prosecutorial rebuttal is addressed infra at notes
102 to 169 and accompanying text.
43. In a close case, evidence of a defendant's good character may be enough to raise a
reasonable doubt and justify acquittal. People v. Drwal, 27 Ill.
2d 184, 188 N.E.2d 688 (1963);
see Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 366 (1896); United States v. Donnelly, 179 F.2d
227, 233 (7th Cir. 1950). McCormick notes: "It is a merciful dispensation to the accused of
hitherto blameless life to allow him to open this door of character." MCCORMICK (2d ed.),
supra note 18, § 191 at 456. The Advisory Committee of the Federal Rules of Evidence
characterized the criminal rule as being "so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to...
override doubts of the basic relevancy of the evidence." FED. R. EviD. 404, Advisory Comm.
Notes.
44. 1 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 5, § 59; JONES (6th ed.), supra note 19, § 4.46, at 477.
45. People v. Celmars, 332 Ill.
113, 163 N.E. 421 (1928).
46. People v. Dorn, 46 Ill.
App. 3d 820, 361 N.E.2d 353 (1977). Traditionally, common
law had required that the reputation be that obtained in the community in which the accused
lived. Today, recognition of changing social and living patterns has broadened the scope of
the "relevant community" to include the workplace and other environments frequented by
the accused. See MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 191 at 456.
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Evidence of Character of the Victim Offered by Defendant
A second common law exception to the general exclusionary doctrine permits the accused to introduce evidence of the character of
the victim of the crime.48 For example, where a defendant pleads
self-defense to a charge of murder, he is entitled to introduce evidence of the victim's violent nature, to allow the jury to infer circumstantially that the victim was the first aggressor." Federal and
proposed Illinois rule 404(a)(2) codify this second exception.'
A particularly controversial facet of this exception involves the
character of the rape victim. Illinois has recently enacted a "rapeshield" law,5 which provides that in prosecutions for rape or deviate
sexual assault the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the
47. People v. Willy, 301 Il1. 307, 133 N.E. 859 (1922). In that case, the defendant was
charged with murder. The court stated: "[als a general proposition, the evidence of character should relate to the time when the character of the person will tend to illustrate the act
in question." Id. at 318, 133 N.E. at 864.
48. 1 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 5, § 63.
49. People v. Baer, 35 Ill. App. 3d 391, 342 N.E.2d 177 (1976).
50. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) and PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 404(a)(2) (Final Draft). See text
at note 16 supra. The manner and scope of prosecutorial rebuttal is addressed infra at notes
102 to 169 and accompanying text.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (1978) provides:
a. In prosecutions for rape or deviate sexual assault, the prior sexual activity or
the reputation of the alleged victim is inadmissible except as evidence concerning
the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim with the accused.
b. No evidence admissible under this Section shall be introduced unless ruled
admissible by the trial judge after an offer of proof has been made at a hearing to
be held in camera in order to determine whether the defense has evidence to impeach the witness in the event that prior sexual activity with the defendant is
denied. Unless the court finds that such evidence is available, counsel for the
defendant shall be ordered to refrain from inquiring into prior sexual activity between the alleged victim and the defendant.
This statute greatly alters the common law in Illinois. Previously, where the defense to a rape
charge was consent by the victim, the defendant was permitted to show the general reputation
of the prosecutrix for immorality. The testimony had to be confined to the general reputation
before the act charged, and evidence of specific acts was not permitted. See People v. Collins,
25 Ill. 2d 605, 186 N.E.2d 30 (1962); People v. Fryman, 4 11. 2d 224, 122 N.E.2d 573 (1954);
People v. Don, 46 Ill. App. 3d 820, 361 N.E.2d 353 (1977). There was an exception to this
rule, however, which allowed evidence of specific prior acts between the defendant and complainant to establish the familiarity between the parties. See People v. Kraus, 395 Ill. 233,
69 N.E.2d 885 (1946); People v. Burke, 152 Ill. App. 2d 159, 201 N.E.2d 636 (1964).
The plight of the rape victim has recived a great deal of attention and comment in the
last several years, and a number of states have enacted so-called "rape shield laws." The
controversy surrounding this area is beyond the scope of this article. For more complete
discussion, see: Comment, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertainingto the
Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of
Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403 (1975); Comment, Rape and Rape
Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919 (1973); Hibey, The Trial of a Rape
Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration,Consent, and Character,11 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
309 (1973).
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alleged victim is inadmissible except as evidence concerning the
past sexual conduct of the alleged victim with the accused. Before
the trial judge can allow any such evidence, he must hold an in
camera hearing to determine whether this evidence is actually available to the defendant. Similarly, the Federal Rules of Evidence have
been amended to include a new provision for the protection of the
privacy of rape victims. New federal rule 412 excludes evidence of
the past sexual behavior of an alleged rape victim, subject to certain
very limited exceptions."
52.

FED. R. EvID. 412 provides:

Rule 412, Rape Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation or
opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or
assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, evidence of a
victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not
admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is (1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c) (1) and (c)(2) and is constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the
alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior -with the accused and is offered by the accused upon the
issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect
to which rape or assault is alleged.
(c)(1) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent to commit
rape intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances of the
alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a written motion to
offer such evidence not later than fifteen days before the date on which the trial in
which such evidence is to be offered is scheduled to begin, except that the court
may allow the motion to be made at a later date, including during trial, if the court
determines either that the evidence is newly discovered and could not have been
obtained earlier through the exercise of due diligence or that the issue to which such
evidence relates has newly arisen in the case. Any motion made under this paragraph shall be served on all other parties and on the alleged victim.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a written
offer of proof. If the court determines that the offer of proof contains evidence
described in subdivision (b), the court shall order a hearing in chambers to determine if such evidence is admissible. At such hearing the parties may call witnesses,
including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence. Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of rule 104, if the relevancy of the evidence which the accused seeks to offer
in the trial depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at the
hearing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled for such
purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such condition of fact is
fulfilled and shall determine such issue.
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in paragraph (2)
that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the probative
value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall
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Evidence of Witness Character

The third exception to the general exclusionary rule deals with
the character of witnesses. The common law exception is codified
in federal and proposed Illinois rule 404(a)(3) 13 and allows the character of witnesses to be examined as provided in rules 607, 51 608, 55
be admissible in the trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies evidence
which may be offered and areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be
examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term 'past sexual behavior' means sexual behavior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which rape or assault with intent
to commit rape is alleged.
Sec. 3. The amendments made by this Act shall apply to trials which begin more
than thirty days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
53. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) and PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (Final Draft). See text
at note 16 supra.
54. FED. R. EviD. 607 provides: "Who May Impeach: The credibility of a witness may be
attacked by any party, including the party calling him." The Federal Rule is different from
PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 607 (Final Draft) which provides:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, except that the
credibility of a witness may be attacked by the party calling the witness by means
of a prior inconsistent statement only upon a showing of surprise and affirmative
damage. The foregoing exception does not apply to impeachment by means of a
prior inconsistent statement admitted pursuant to 801(d)(1)(A), Rule 801(d)(2) or
803.
The Committee Comments make it clear that the proposed rule codifies the present Illinois
common law requirements of affirmative damage and surprise. PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 607
Committee Comments (Final Draft). Rule 607 will not be considered any further since this
article is concerned with methods and subject matter of character impeachment, and assumes
that the party seeking to impeach has proper standing to do so.
55. FED. R. EvID. 608 provides:
Evidence of Characterand Conduct of Witness
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of
crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with
respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 608 (Final Draft) provides:
Evidence of Characterof Witness.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence of reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) The evidence may refer only to character
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and 609.6 These rules address the manner, scope, and subject matter of witness impeachment and are in general harmony with the
common law. This area will now be discussed by examining the
common law, the proposed Illnois rules, and the federal rules.
USE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES

Attacking or Supporting Witness Veracity: Rule 608
Character evidence may be used for impeachment purposes as
well as substantive purposes. For example, if a criminal defendant
calls a supporting character witness under the first exception to the
exclusionary rule, the prosecution may attack the witness's own
character for veracity.5 7 One of the methods by which this may be
accomplished is by calling an impeaching witness, whose testimony
must be directed at and confined to the prior witness's reputation
for truthfulness in the community."
Courts differ in their interpretation of what constitutes an attack
on the truthfulness of a witness, but the general consensus is that
mere contradiction is not enough. Rather, an impeaching witness
must directly testify that the prior witness has a bad reputation for
truthfulness.59 After such testimony, the impeaching witness may be
asked one further question: "Knowing that reputation, would you
believe him under oath?" 0 It has long been recognized that this
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) Evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
reputation evidence or otherwise.
For discussion of the differences between these two similar rules, see notes 60 to 69 and 84 to
86 and accompanying text infra.
56. See note 100, infra, for the text of FED. R. EVID. 609. See also note 94, infra, for the
text of PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 609 (Final Draft).
57. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 44 at 90.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Tedens v. Schumers, 112 Ill.
263, 266 (1884); Sesterhenn v. Saxe, 88111. App.
2d 2, 232 N.E.2d 277 (1967); People v. Jinkins, 82 III. App. 2d 150, 225 N.E.2d 657 (1967).
60. Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 11 111. 367 (1849). The court stated the rules as follows:
The proper question to be put to a witness called to impeach another is, whether
he knows the general reputation of the person sought to be impeached among his
neighbors, for truth and veracity. If this question be answered affirmatively, the
witness may then be inquired of as to what that reputation is, and whether from
that reputation he would believe him on oath.
Id. at 379. Cf. People v. Lehner, 326 Ill. 216, 157 N.E. 211 (1927), where the impeaching
witnesses, after testifying that the general reputation of the defendant for truth and veracity
was bad, were asked: "Based on that reputation, would you believe (the defendant) under
oath in any matter in which he was personally interested?" The court held that it was error
to allow the witness to consider in the question the matter of the personal interest of the
defendant. See also Burke v. Zwick, 299 II1. App. 558, 20 N.E.2d 912 (1939); 7 WIGMORE (3d
ed.), supra note 5, §§ 1985, 1986.
The prior witness being impeached could, of course, be the defendant in a criminal action.
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question abrogates any meaningful distinction between opinion and
reputation testimony." This recognition served as one of the strongest arguments in favor of allowing opinion evidence under the federal rules.2 Federal rule 608 therefore permits the impeaching witness to testify as to his own opinion of the prior witness's truthful
character. 3 Proposed Illinois rule 608, however, would continue to
prohibit the use of opinion testimony. 4
A direct attack on the character witness's reputation for truthfulness alloWs the proponent of the impeached witness to bolster the
witness's credibility. 5 This may be accomplished by calling a witness to rehabilitate the character witness through testimony regarding the truthful reputation of the impeached witness. It is only after
the character witness's truthful reputation is directly impugned
that a rehabilitation witness may be called. The rehabilitation witness may be impeached by cross-examination, but it is not permissible for the opponent to call a further impeaching witness to directly
attack the character of the rehabilitation witness.6 Once again, the
common law 7 and proposed Illinois rule 60811 forbid opinion evidence in this situation while federal rule 608 allows the use of such
testimony. 9
Prohibitionon Impeachment by Prior Bad Acts
Evidence that a witness has been arrested, indicted, or accused
It should be noted that by taking the witness stand and testifying generally the defendant
does not "open the door" to questioning about his characterfor the particular trait involved
in the alleged crime; rather, he has placed only his credibility "in issue," and impeachment,
whether by cross-examination or by an impeaching witness, is restricted to evidence concerning his reputation for truth and veracity. The policy behind this limitation is to encourage the defendant to testify in his own behalf without fear of attack through "other
crimes" evidence. See generally LOUIsELL & MUELLER, supra note 20, § 138 at 103.
61. 7 WIGMORE (3d ed.), supra note 5, §§ 1985, 1986; Udall, supra note 15, at 294; Ladd,
Witnesses, 10 RuTrERS L. REV. 523, 537 (1956).
62. FED. R. EviD. 405, Advisory Comm. Notes.
63. FED. R. EVID. 608. See note 55, supra for the text of federal rule 608.
64. PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 608 (Final Draft). See note 55, supra for the text of proposed
rule 608.
65. The general test for the admissibility of such testimony is whether evidence supporting the impeached witness's character is logically relevant to the impeaching fact. "The wall,
attacked at one point, may not be fortified at another and distinct point." MCCORMICK (2d
ed.), supra note 18, § 49 at 103.
66. See Udall, supra note 15, at 289.
67. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18 § 49 at 102.
68. PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 608 (Final Draft). See note 55 supra for the text of proposed
rule 608.
69. FED. R. EvID. 608. See note 55, supra for the text of federal rule 608. See also notes 84
to 86 infra for a discussion of the use of specific instances of conduct to attack or support the
character of a witness.
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of any unsavory conduct which has not resulted in a conviction,
offered for the purpose of impairing credibility, is prohibited by the
majority of common law jurisdictions, 0 including Illinois. 71 Furthermore, inquiries on cross-examination concerning such allegations
are prohibited.7 1 If evidence of bad acts were tolerated, the resultant
cycle of charge counteracted by refutation would mire every trial in
wholly immaterial, irrelevant, and time consuming side issues. Additionally, cross-examination of witnesses as to their character, reputation, and past activities when not relevant or material exposes
them to unjustifiable and unnecessary ridicule and embarrass3
ment.1
It is proper, however, on cross-examination to bring out the witness's unlawful or disreputable occupation and activity as a matter
affecting credibility.74 For example, in People v. White75 a defense
witness testified on direct examination that he was a bartender; on
cross-examination it was disclosed that the witness operated a gambling house. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
The law does not permit proof of other offenses not connected with
the charge upon which the defendant is being tried, but the prosecution could not be hampered nor restrained in perfectly legitimate cross-examination because an inference unfavorable to defendant might arise. Surely the prosecution was not required to
permit this witness to appear before the jury as a man of high
character and worthy of confidence when he was disreputable and
his chief occupation that of a law-breaker.7 6
70. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 42 at 83.
71. People v. Mason, 28 Ill. 2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 835 (1963); People v. Soto, 64 Ill. App. 2d
94, 212 N.E.2d 353 (1965); see generally Ladd, supra note 3, at 508-09.
72. People v. Mason, 28 Ill. 2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 835 (1963). The court stated:
The rule prevailing in most jurisdictions and supported by the great weight of
authority is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested,
charged with a criminal offense, or confined in prison, or to inquire as to such fact
upon cross-examination, where no conviction is shown, for the purpose of impairing
his credibility.
Id. at 401-02, 192 N.E.2d at 837.
73. Ladd, supra note 3, at 508-09.
74. People v. Gibson, 133 Ill. App. 2d 722, 272 N.E.2d 274 (1971).
75. 251 IIl. 67, 95 N.E. 1036 (1911).
76. Id. at 73-74, 95 N.E. at 1039 (case cites omitted). In People v. Bond, 281 Ill. 490, 118
N.E. 14 (1917), the court held it was proper for the state to cross-examine a defense witness
as to whether or not she was the keeper of a house of ill fame, saying: "If a witness is engaged
in an unlawful and disreputable occupation, in justice and fairness he should not be permitted to appear before the jury as a person of high character who is engaged in a lawful and
respectable occupation."
Id. at 493, 118 N.E. at 18. See also People v, Crump, 5 111.2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615 (1955)
(state's principal witness had been a jointly indicted codefendant; held that defendant should
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Furthermore, the fact that a witness has been charged with or
arrested for a crime may be brought out when it reasonably tends
to show that his testimony might be influenced by bias, prejudice,
interest, or a motive to testify falsely." Thus, the defendant may
cross-examine a state's witness to show that recent criminal charges
pending against the witness have been dropped or reduced; such
cross-examination impairs the credibility of the witness by showing
that he has something to gain by testifying against the defendant."M
As a rule, the defendant is allowed the widest latitude in this area."9
Because the court must be alert to protect the witness from harassment,80 evidence offered to show bias or prejudice must be truly
probative of these traits in order to be admissible.8
In a situation where the cross-examination of a witness reveals
bias or prejudice, the party offering the witness is entitled to rehabilitate him on re-direct examination. If, in the exercise of judicial
discretion, the reasons for the bias or prejudice have a genuine tendency to rehabilitate, then such reasons are clearly a proper and
relevant subject of re-direct examination.12 The trial judge should
prohibit such questioning, however, if its rehabilitative tendency is
not apparent, and the justification for inquiry into the source of the
bias or prejudice appears to serve as a pretext to inject extraneous
83
or inflammatory issues into the case.
Present Illinois common law is codified in proposed Illinois rule
608;. the rule is directed specifically at evidence of witness character
and omits all mention of prior specific instances of witness conduct. 4 In contrast, federal rule 608(b)8 1 permits cross-examination
of a witness concerning specific incidents of conduct, other than
have been able to show witness was or had been a drug addict or had used narcotics on the
day of the alleged crime); People v. Gibson, 133 Ill. App. 2d 722, 272 N.E.2d 274 (1971)
(reviewing cases).
77. People v. Vagil, 9 Ill. App. 3d 726, 292 N.E.2d 557 (1973).
78. Cf. People v. Mason,. 28 Ill. 2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 835 (1963).
79. People v. Naujokas, 25 III. 2d 32, 37, 182 N.E.2d 700, 703 (1962).
80. People v. Hanks, 17 Ill. App. 3d 633, 307 N.E.2d 638 (1974).
81. People v. Curtis, 48 Ill. App. 3d 375, 362 N.E.2d 1319 (1977); People v. Pickett, 34
Ill. App. 3d 590, 340 N.E.2d 259 (1975).
82. People v. Burke, 52 Ill. App. 2d 159, 201 N.E.2d 636 (1964). In that case the defendant
was prosecuted for incest with his sixteen-year-old daughter. On cross-examination the prosecutrix admitted that she hated the defendant before the incident for which he was charged
took place. On re-direct, she was permitted, over strenuous objection, to state that the basis
for her hatred was that the defendant had on previous occasions performed unnatural sexual
acts upon her.
83. Id.
84. PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 608 (Final Draft). See note 55 supra for the text of proposed
rule 608.
85. FED. R. EviD. 608(b). See note 55 supra for text of federal rule 608(b).
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criminal convictions, if, in the discretion of the court, such inquiry
would be probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Under the
federal rule, the witness also may be examined concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of an individual to whose
character that witness has testified. The deliberate omission by the
Illinois drafters of a counterpart to federal rule 608(b) demonstrates
an intent to foreclose questioning about specific instances of prior
conduct of witnesses."'
Impeachment Through Prior Convictions: Rule 609
A witness's credibility also may be impaired by evidence of his
criminal conduct. Illinois common law therefore permits evidence of
prior felony convictions or of prior convictions for offenses involving
dishonesty or false statements."7 However, should the court determine that "the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" to the defendant, such evidence will not be admitted." This standard applies
to both civil and criminal cases. 9 Where the witness is a defendant
in a criminal case, evidence of a conviction cannot be elicited from
him on cross-examination but must be proven by the record of conviction. 0 This restriction does not apply to any other witnesses.9
86. See PROPOSED ILL. R. EviD. 405, Committee Comments (Final Draft).
87. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
88. Id. In Montgomery, the court adopted the proposed rule 609 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and held that a 21-year-old conviction was too remote in time to affect the credibility of the accused who took the stand and that the trial court does have discretion to prevent
admission into evidence of a prior conviction where "the probative value of the evidence of
the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 47 I1. 2d 510, 516,
268 N.E.2d 695, 698.
At common law in Illinois only an "infamous" crime (defined in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §124-1(1977)) could be introduced into evidence to
impeach the testimony of a witness, whether a party or not. See, e.g., People v. Lehner, 326
Ill. 216, 157 N.E. 211 (1927). Montgomery eliminates the distinction between infamous crimes
and misdemeanors for impeachment purposes in criminal cases.
89. The Montgomery rule was extended to civil cases in Knowles v. Panopoulos, 66 I1.
2d 585, 363 N.E. 2d 805 (1977). In that case decedent, a passenger on a motorcycle driven by
his stepbrother, Rigsby, was killed as a result of a collision with defendant's vehicle. At the
trial, on cross-examination and over objection, the court allowed evidence of the prior conviction of Rigsby for criminal trespass to a vehicle, a misdemeanor. Plaintiff contended that only
infamous crimes (as defined by the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, ILL. Rv. STAT. ch.
38 § 124-1 (1977)) could be introduced to impeach a witness in a civil proceeding. The court
held that the standards announced in Montgomery were applicable to civil cases and that,
for the purposes of impeachment of testimony, there is no distinction between misdemeanors
and infamous crimes when introducing prior convictions in civil and criminal proceedings.
90. People v. Dye, 23 Il1. App. 3d 453, 319 N.E. 2d 102 (1974). In that case, the prosecution offered in evidence the original court file containing the record of the defendant's prior
burglary conviction. The court upheld this method of proof:
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Convictions over ten years old are generally inadmissible." When

evidence of a conviction is allowed, questioning 3is limited to the
name of the crime and the punishment imposed.1
Proposed Illinois rule 609"1 would significantly alter the foregoing
In criminal cases conviction of any crime may be shown for the purpose of affecting
the credibility of a witness (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch 38, par. 155-1), but there is no
comparable provision relating to the method of proof. However, case law has developed to encourage a defendant to take the stand by avoiding the prejudicial effect
of the proof of the prior conviction coming from a defendant's own testimony on
cross-examination and requiring the State to prove the conviction by the record.
Id. at 455, 319 N.E.2d at 103.
See also People v. Humphrey, 129 Ill. App. 2d 404, 262 N.E.2d 721 (1970) (certified copy
proper); People v. Smith, 63 Ill. App. 2d 369, 211 N.E.2d 456 (1965) (testimony of the
particular court clerk approved).
91. People v. Halkens, 386 Ill. 167, 53 N.E.2d 923 (1944). In that case, a witness for
defendant was cross-examined concerning his prior robbery convictions. After a lengthy review of the history and policy of the impeachment-by-conviction rule, the court concluded
that it was proper for a witness, who was not a defendant, to be questioned about his prior
conviction on cross-examination.
92. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
93. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 43 at 88.
94. PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 609 (Final Draft) reads:
Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him during cross-examination
or established by public record but only if the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party and the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the
court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is
not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the
rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has been convicted of a subsequent
crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible
under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence
is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of
a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
(f) Fair Opportunity to Contest. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such
evidence.
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standards. First, before a conviction could be introduced, the court
would have to decide that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect to a party. 5 Rule 609's
reversal of the present standard reflects the view of the majority of
the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Evidence that
"as to the issue of credibility the probative value of a prior conviction is slight in comparison with its prejudicial effects and should
generally be excluded."" Secondly, evidence of conviction would
not be admissible unless the proponent gave the adverse party advance written notice sufficient to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence., 7 The rule,
however, would permit evidence of a conviction to be brought out
on cross-examination of the defendant, as well as by the record of
8
conviction.
The minority of the Illinois Supreme Court Committee strongly
criticized the requirement put forth in proposed rule 609 that evidence of a conviction may be used to impeach only if the court
determines that the probative value "substantially" outweighs its
prejudicial effect to a "party."" The minority urged the Illinois
Supreme Court to adopt the standard of federal rule 609.'101 The
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

PROPOSED
PROPOSED
PROPOSED
PROPOSED
PROPOSED

ILL.

ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
FED. R. EVD.

R. EVID. 609(a) (Final Draft).

R. EVID. 609, Majority Discussion (Final Draft).
R. EVID. 609(f) (Final Draft).
R. EvID. 609(a) (Final Draft).
R. EVID. 609, Minority Discussion (Final Draft).
609 provides:
Impeachment By Evidence of Conviction of
Crime
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction
more than 10 years old as calculated herein is not admissible unless the proponent
gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of
such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject
of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure
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federal rule provides that this evidence shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. The admissibility
of conviction evidence is thus determined by judicial discretion
under the federal rule. By recommending that the probative value
"substantially" outweigh the prejudicial effect to a "party," the
proposed Illinois rule would virtually eliminate the court's exercise
of discretion.'0 '
PROBLEMS AND DANGERS PRESENTED BY CHARACTER EVIDENCE

In a case where the criminal defendant "opens the door" to charbased on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person
has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a
pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction
of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court
is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the
issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is
admissible.
101. PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 609, Majority Discussion (Final Draft). Impeachment through
evidence of prior convictions has been severely criticized, see Spector, Impeaching The Defendant By His Prior Convictions And the Proposed Rules Of Federal Evidence: A Half Step
Forward And Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy. CI. L.J. 247 (1970); Note, Impeaching the
Accused by His Prior Crimes-A New Approach to an Old Problem, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 919
(1968). Evaluation of the wisdom or folly of this mode of impeachment is beyond the scope
of this article; however, it should be noted that the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v.
Montgomery, 47 IIl. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971), stated that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to refuse to allow a defendant to be impeached by a prior criminal
conviction if the trial judge believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment outweighs the
probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility. Citing Gordon v. United
States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court noted the various factors the Gordon court
had sugggested be considered in making the determination, including the nature of the crime,
nearness or remoteness, the subsequent career of the person, and whether the crime was
similar to the one charged. Gordon pointed out the tendency of a lay jury to reason: "If he
did it before, he probably did it this time." Impeachment by conviction for the same crime,
the Gordon court therefore concluded, should be used "sparingly; one solution might well be
that discretion be exercised to limit the impeachment by way of similar crime to a single
conviction and then only when the circumstances indicate strong reasons for disclosure, and
where the conviction directly relates to veracity." 383 F.2d at 940. See Spector, Impeachment
By Past Convictions: What Hath Montgomery Wrought?, 10 Lov. CHI. L.J. 339 (1979).
See also People v. Jacobs, 51 Ill. App. 3d 455, 366 N.E.2d 1064 (1977), where the court
points out that there is less possibility of unfair prejudice when a prior conviction is used to
impeach a witness than when it is used to impeach a defendant, because a defendant who
has committed a previous crime may be convicted because of his prior offense, rather than
because of the lack of credibility in his defense.
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acter evidence by presenting evidence of his past character, the
prosecution is permitted to counteract the defendant's favorable
evidence in several ways. As previously discussed, the prosecution
can attack the defendant's character witness by calling its own wit-2
nesses to impugn the character witness's reputation for veracity.1
Furthermore, the defendant's witness may be impeached by questioning designed to impair the witness's credibility, for example, by
01 3
cross-examining the witness about a prior inconsistent statement.
The prosecution may also rebut the defendant's evidence by calling its own witnesses to testify to the defendant's bad character
reputation.' 4 Here, the prosecution witnesses are not attacking the
defendant's character witnesses, but rather are directly contradicting them. 10 5 In the event this method is employed, the prosecution
must initially establish that the rebuttal witness is familiar with the
defendant's reputation for the trait in issue. The witness may respond that the reputation is bad, but in Illinois he may neither
testify as to specific acts nor from his personal knowledge. 10
Finally, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant's character witnesses in an effort to test the witness's knowledge of the
trait to which he has just testified, and the factual basis supporting
that testimony. 017 In Illinois, however, the permissible manner and
scope of this type of cross-examination has been the subject of a long
line of confusing and conflicting supreme court opinions; 05 as a
result, it is unclear what procedure should be followed in this area.
This problem will now be analyzed by discussing the prevailing
majority practice, contrasting Illinois case law to the majority rule,
102. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Tornquist, The PriorInconsistent Statement: The Illinois Law, The Art, and
Things to Come, 10 Loy. Cm. L.J. 381 (1979).
104. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 191 at 459; LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note
20, § 138 at 102.
105. MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 191 at 459.
106. People v. Wendt, 104 Ill. App. 2d 192, 244 N.E.2d 384 (1969). That case involved a
defendant charged with taking indecent liberties with a child. The principal of the school
attended by the complainant was called by the defense to testify about the complainant's
reputation for truth and veracity in the community. During the direct examination of the
witness it became apparent that he was basing his testimony on his own personal opinion
and knowledge, rather than the complainant's reputation. The court therefore struck the
witness's testimony and held: "A witness may testify concerning his knowledge of another
witness's general reputation in a particular community for truth and veracity. However, the
testimony may not be based upon the personal opinion of the witness, and must not be
concerned with specific instances as opposed to general reputation." Id. at 210, 244 N.E.2d
at 390.
107. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 20, § 138 at 98.
108. See notes 132 to 167 infra and accompanying text.

19791

Character Evidence

and examining how this facet of Illinois character law would be
affected by the proposed rules.
Majority Practice Regarding Cross-Examination of Character
Witnesses
The prosecution may question the character witness concerning
the basis of his expressed judgment, his opportunities for forming
that judgment, his acquaintance with the defendant, and the number of persons he has heard relate opinions of the defendant."', In
nearly all jurisdictions, the witness may also be asked whether he
has heard rumors or reports of prior associations, vices, or acts by
the defendant that are inconsistent with the good character to which
he has just testified."0 For example, if the defendant is charged with
robbery, the character witness may be asked whether he has heard
that the defendant was previously arrested for burglary, even
though this prior charge did not result in a conviction. In those
jurisdictions that forbid "personal knowledge" testimony and allow
only "reputation" testimony, the questions must be couched in the
form of "have you heard" rather than "do you know.""' The question must be asked in "good faith"; in other words, the prosecution
must demonstrate to the court that there is indeed a factual basis
underlying the inquiry.' In a case where the witness denies having
109.
110.

Ladd, supra note 3, at 529.
Id.; State v. Schull, 131 Or. 224, 282 P. 237 (1929), annotated in 71 A.L.R. 1498;
MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 191 at 456.
111. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481-82 (1948); MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra
note 18, § 191 at 457.
112. Udall, supra note 15, at 291; MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 191 at 458;
LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 20, § 138 at 100. See also Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469 (1948). The Michelson Court, after noting that the trial judge satisfied himself that
counsel was not merely engaged on a fishing expedition, but had an actual event as the target
of his question, stated:
This procedure was recommended by Wigmore. But analysis of his innovation
emphasizes the way in which law on this subject has evolved from pragmatic considerations rather than from theoretical consistency. The relevant information that
is permissible to lay before the jury is talk or conversation about the defendant's
being arrested. That is admissible whether or not an actual arrest had taken place;
it might even be more significant of repute if his neighbors were ready to arrest him
in rumor when the authorities were not in fact. But before this relevant and proper
inquiry can be made, counsel must demonstrate privately to the court an irrelevant
and possibly unprovable fact-the reality of arrest. From this permissible inquiry
about reports of arrest, the jury is pretty certain to infer that defendant had in fact
been arrested and to draw its own conclusions as to character from that fact. The
Wigmore suggestion thus limits legally relevant inquiries to those based on legally
irrelevant facts in order that the legally irrelevant conclusion which the jury probably will draw from the relevant questions will not be based on unsupported or
untrue innuendo. . . .Yet, despite its theoretical paradoxes and deficiencies, we
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heard of the particular incident alleged by the rumor or denies having heard the rumor, the prosecution must "take the answer" and
extrinsic evidence to substantiate the rumor is not permitted." 3 If,
however, the witness admits being familiar with these rumors or
incidents, he may then be asked whether, assuming the reports were
4
true, he would still regard the defendant's reputation favorably.1
Theoretically, inquiries concerning prior bad acts are made to test
the knowledge and credibility of the character witness. 5 If the witness has never heard the rumors that such alleged conduct would
generate, the jury may reasonably question the witness's actual
familiarity with the defendant's reputation."' Conversely, should
the witness admit to having heard these damaging reports but still
assert that the defendant's reputation for the particular trait is
good, his credibility is ruined and his value to the defendant as a
character witness is negligible."'
Thus, under the guise of testing the knowledge of the character
witness, the jury receives indirectly the very information the general
exclusionary policy is designed to suppress. The prosecution, by
questioning the character witness about a report of the defendant's
arrest, leads the jury to the almost certain conclusion that the arrest
has in fact been suffered; the question itself does the damage, regardless of the response. The jury is solemnly instructed that the
damning innuendo inherent in the query is to be considered only in
the context of th&,witness's credibility, not as a substantive reflection on the character of the accused." 8 Yet almost certainly the jury
is incapable of such mental gymnastics, and of course the prosecution is fully cognizant of this fact.
In this area, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Michelson v. United States"' is generally acknowledged to be the
definitive judicial pronouncement on the operation and rationale of
the majority practice in criminal cases. 20 In Michelson, the defendant was convicted in 1947 of bribing a federal revenue agent.' The
approve the procedure as calculated in practice to hold the inquiry within decent
bounds.
Id. at 481 n.18.
113. Ladd, supra note 3, at 530-31.
114. Id.
115. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 20, § 138 at 98-99.
116. Id.
117. Ladd, supra note 3, at 531.
118. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 492-95 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
119. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
120. LouisELL & MUELLER, supra note 20, § 136 at 86.
121. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 470 (1948).
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defendant admitted payment, but claimed it was done in compliturned
ance with the demands and threats of the agent. The case
2
on whether the jury believed the agent or the accused.1
On direct examination, the defendant acknowleged a misdemeanor conviction in 1927, twenty years earlier.2 3 Five character
witnesses then were called by the defendant; each testified to his
good reputation for honesty and truthfulness. On crossexamination, four of these witnesses were asked whether they had
ever heard that the defendant had been arrested "on October 11,
1920 . . . for receiving stolen goods?"' 2 Each answered, no. The
propriety and usefulness of this cross-examination directed at rumors of past misconduct was challenged vehemently by the defendant. The prosecution privately assured the trial court that there
was factual basis to the question, and the jury received careful
instructions concerning the limited purpose for which the questions
25
were allowed.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Jackson, noted the general
rule excluding the initiation of "prior bad acts" evidence by the
prosecution, 2 and went on to review, evaluate, and approve the
''unique practice concerning character testimony" prevailing in
common law courts.127 The Supreme Court also stated that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had asked it specifically to adopt the
"Illinois rule," a rule that the Court characterized as one "which
allows inquiry about arrest, but only for very closely similar if not
identical charges . . . ."12 However, the Court recognized that the
good character which the defendant in Michelson had sought to
establish was broader than the crime charged and included the
traits of "honesty and truthfulness" and "being a law-abiding citizen:"
Possession of these characteristics would seem as incompatible
with offering a bribe to a revenue agent as with receiving stolen
goods. The crimes may be unlike, but both alike proceed from the
same defects of character which the witnesses said this defendant
was reputed not to exhibit. It is not only by comparison with the
crime on trial but by comparison with the reputation asserted that
a court may judge whether the prior arrest should be made subject
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

471.
472.
475-76.
486.
483.
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of inquiry. By this test the inquiry was permissible. It was proper
cross-examination because reports of his arrest for receiving stolen
goods, if admitted, would tend to weaken the assertion that he was
known as an honest and law-abiding citizen. The crossexamination may take in as much ground as the testimony it is
designed to verify. To hold otherwise would give defendant the
benefit of testimony that he was honest and law-abiding in reputation when such might not be the fact; the refutation was founded
on convictions equally persuasive though not for crimes exactly
repeated in the present charge.1i
On this basis, the suggestion by the Second Circuit was rejected as
"inexpedient." 1 30 The Court concluded that the substantive differences between Illinois and the majority were so slight that adoption
of the Illinois rule was not worth the "confusion and error it would
engender . .. for an almost imperceptible logical improvement, if
any ....
Illinois Practice Regarding Cross-Examination of Character
Witnesses
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
were correct in their characterization of Illinois law as "allow[ing]
inquiry about arrest, but only for very closely similar if not identical
,132 The Illinois Supreme Court has failed to articulate
charges ...
a consistent standard in this area, and Illinois case law simply does
not lend itself to such definitive summarization. The court's failure,
and the confusion it has fostered, is demonstrated by both Professor
Cleary and Dean McCormick in their discussions of the court's decisions on this subject.
Professor Cleary first notes that in People v. Celmars,133 the Illinois Supreme Court held that specific instances of misconduct may
129. Id. at 483-84.
130. Id. at 483.
131. Id. at 487. At the conclusion of its opinion the Court made an oft-quoted statement:
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession that much
of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by
which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy system
when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial
court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely
simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a
rational edifice.
Id. at 486.
132. Id. at 483.
133. 332 Ill. 113, 163 N.E. 421 (1928).
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not be brought out in cross-examination or shown in rebuttal. 3 '
Cleary continues, however, that the court in People v. Hannon3 '
and People v. Greeley 136 suggested that the "policy of this limitation
may be circumvented by asking on cross-examination, under the
guise of testing knowledge of reputation, whether the witness has
heard rumors of misconduct of a kind to negative the character in
question.' 1 37 Similarly, Dean McCormick begins by stating:
"[T]here are indications (in Illinois) of a practice forbidding questions which specify particular acts or rumors thereof."'3 8 McCormick
goes on to conclude, however, that in Greeley the Illinois Supreme
Court approved the majority rule in dicta.3 9 Remarkably, the Illinois Supreme Court Advisory Committee completely omits any
mention of this conflict; in the Comment on Proposed Rule 405, the
committee, without discussion or dissent, cites Celmars as authority
for its view that cross-examination into specific instances of conduct
is flatly prohibited under present Illinois law." 0
A thorough analysis of the historical development of Illinois case
law indicates that the confusion surrounding this subject is the
result of several early, fundamental errors committed by the supreme court. Frye v. Bank of Illinois,"' an 1849 decision, represents
the genesis of the character witness cross-examination problem.
There, the defendant called a witness to testify that the mortgage
in issue had been properly recorded. The complainant attacked the
witness's credibility through evidence of specific acts that were unrelated to the general reputation of the witness for truth and veracity. The court held that the only proper method of witness impeachment was by inquiry confined to the general reputation of the witness for truth and veracity among his neighbors.'
The Illinois Supreme Court next faced the issue of witness impeachment in McCarty v. People."3 There, a defendant charged
with murder offered evidence of his general reputation for good
character; however, the defendant's character witnesses were not
cross-examined on this point. The prosecution subsequently pre134.

'cited as
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 12.8, at 212 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter
CLEARY].

381 Il.206, 44 N.E.2d 923 (1942).
14 I1. 2d 428, 152 N.E.2d 825 (1958).
CLEARY, supra note 134, § 12.8 at 212.
MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 18, § 191 at 456 n.73.
Id.
PROPOSED ILL. R. EVID. 405, Committee Comments (Final Draft).
11 Ill. 367 (1849).
Id. at 379.
51 Ill. 231 (1869).
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sented rebuttal evidence of rumors of the defendant's specific acts
of misconduct. In a cryptic opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the trial judge erred in allowing this evidence to be presented;
the court reasoned that no one would put his good character in issue
"if it could be rebutted by proof of rumors or reports of particular
aberrations.""'4 It should be noted that the court's ruling was addressed to the impermissible nature of the rebuttal evidence; the
permissible method of character witness cross-examination was
never considered. This important distinction was overlooked by the
court in subsequent decisions.
Perhaps the most troublesome of these later decisions is Gifford
v. People."5 There, the defendant was accused of rape. On crossexamination, the prosecution did not question the defendant's character witness about the defendant's reputation for chastity. Rather,
the witness was asked, "Have you not heard people say that he was
a gambler or gambled?" Later, after the defendant himself testified,
he was compelled to state during cross-examination that he had
visited houses of prostitution, and also that he had played cards for
money.' 6 The court, citing McCarty, overturned the conviction,
stating that particular acts of misconduct are never admissible to
rebut evidence of a defendant's good character. In addition, the
court, relying on Frye, held that the questioning by the prosecution
was improper to impeach the defendant's reputation as a witness,
since a witness's reputation could only be impeached by proving
that he has a poor reputation for truth and veracity, not by proof of
specific acts." 7
A close reading of Gifford reveals that the court reached its decision without engaging in any significant analysis of the issues presented by the case. As a result, the court made three important
conceptual errors. First, it applied McCarty, a case which had prohibited the introduction of specific bad acts during rebuttal, to a
situation where specific bad acts were being inquired into on crossexamination of a defendant. The court thus apparently adopted a
broad rule prohibiting inquiry into relevant prior bad acts of a defendant during cross-examination, even after a defendant has
placed his own character in issue.
Secondly, the court applied Frye, where it had held that a witness's credibility could be tested on cross-examination only by
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 232.
87 Il1. 210 (1877).
Id. at 214.

Id.
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evidence attacking his reputation for truthfulness, to an instance
where the prosecution was attempting, through cross-examination,
to use prior bad acts to refute the defendant's favorable character
evidence. In effect, the court took a rule originally designed to
protect a witness from irrelevant inquiries about his character and
extended it to protect a defendant who had deliberately opened
the door to such questioning.
Finally, the fact that the cross-examination of both the defendant
and his character witness raised the issue of the defendant's prior
gambling activities was never addressed by the court. By failing to
take notice of this improper and irrelevant line of questioning, the
48
court overlooked the only legitimate basis for reversal.
Twenty-two years later, in 1899, the Illinois Supreme Court reinforced the Gifford errors in Aiken v. People.' 9 There, the defendant,
a physician, was accused of performing an abortion which led to his
patient's death. The physician introduced numerous witnesses who
testified to his favorable reputation as a "peaceable and lawabiding" man. On cross-examination, several of these witnesses
were asked whether they had ever heard rumors linking the defendant to the burning of some farm property years before; several
answered that they had heard such reports. The witnesses, however,
all gave negative responses when asked similar questions concerning
the defendant's involvement in other abortions. Each of the questions asked of the character witnesses on cross-examination were in
the acceptable "have you heard" form. Moreover, the questions
were propounded to test the knowledge of the character witnesses.
The prosecution neither offered evidence of specific bad acts nor
queried the defendant himself about his past misconduct.
Clearly, under the majority rule this questioning was proper. The
court, however, adhering to its decision in Gifford, reversed the
defendant's conviction. Once again the court failed to properly analyze the evidentiary issues at hand. The court believed that the
prosecution, by cross-examining the character witnesses about the
defendant's prior bad acts, had introduced improper evidence about
the defendant's character in rebuttal. Here, as in Gifford, the court
misapplied McCarty, ignoring the distinction between the improper
148. It is interesting to note that the court could have reversed the defendant's conviction
solely on the basis of this irrelevant and improper line of questioning. In essence, it appears
that the court recognized that some type of reversible error had occurred, but failed to
perceive the precise nature of the error. Striving to find some basis on which to rest a reversal,
the court misapplied two prior cases in a related area and, fortuitiously, reached a proper
result.
149. 183 Ill. 215, 55 N.E. 695 (1899).
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introduction of specific bad acts during direct examination of rebuttal witnesses, and the legitimate cross-examination of a reputation
witness concerning events which reflect poorly on the defendant's
reputation. The court's decision is even more remarkable in light of
the lucid dissent by Chief Judge Cartwright:
I understand the rule to be that on cross-examination the sources
and the nature of [the character witness's] information may be
inquired into, for the purpose of showing the grounds of the estimate given by the witness, and testing his credibility. It is not
proper to prove in rebuttal specific acts of misconduct. . . . Such
cross-examination is not permitted for the purpose of proving the
particular fact, but to weaken the force of direct testimony. Under
this rule, a witness who testifies to good reputation may be crossexamined concerning specific facts5 and rumors which are inconsistent with his direct testimony. 1
Judge Cartwright's dissent provided a basis for the court's ruling
in a later encounter with this evidentiary problem. In People v.
Willy, 5 ' twenty-one witnesses attested to the peaceful reputation of
the murder defendant. Nine witnesses testified to the defendant's
bad reputation during the prosecution's case in rebuttal. On crossexamination, the defense counsel showed that the rebuttal witnesses had based their estimation of defendant's reputation solely
on their own knowledge of a twenty-five-year-old arrest for indecent
exposure. The court ruled that, due to the personal opinion and time
attenuation involved, this testimony should have been stricken. For
the first time, the Illinois Supreme Court systematically reviewed
and analyzed the character evidence rules; the court stated that "a
witness to good character may be asked, on cross-examination, if he
has heard rumors or conversations of particular charges of the commission of acts inconsistent with the character which he is called
upon to prove.' 1 52 This holding is in direct accord with the majority
rule.
The Illinois Supreme Court again reversed course, however, in the
case of People v. Celmars. 53 In Celmars, a defendant charged with
rape called his supervisor, the head waiter of the club at which the
defendant worked, as a character witness. The supervisor was questioned about the defendant's general reputation for truth and veracity; he replied that the defendant was "attentive to duty and sober150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 220, 55 N.E. at 698.
301 Ill. 307, 133 N.E. 859 (1922).
Id. at 319, 133 N.E. at 864.
332 Ill. 113, 163 N.E. 421 (1928).
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minded." On cross-examination the state's attorney asked the witness, "Did you make it your business to learn whether he had ever
been in any penal institutions?" and "Well, did you know about his
being in the reformatory?"' 54
The court stated that the trait of being "attentive to duty and
sober-minded" was irrelevant to the true inquiry involving the defendant's reputation for chastity. Although this finding was correct,
the court overlooked the improper form of the subsequent crossexamination. No mention was made of the fact that the prosecutor's
questions were propounded in the "do you know" rather than the
"have you heard" form. Instead, without foundational development
or analysis, the court, citing Aiken, Gifford, and McCarty, held:
"On cross-examination or in rebuttal of proof of good character,
particular acts of misconduct may not be shown."' 55
In reaching this singular conclusion, the court made no attempt
to distinguish between cross-examination directed at the foundation
of witness testimony, witness credibility, rebuttal testimony, and
personal opinion testimony. Furthermore, the court totally omitted
any mention of the Willy ruling, a considered analysis made only
eight years before. 5 '
The Illinois Supreme Court again confronted the problems and
inconsistencies of this line of cases in People v. Hannon."7 In
Hannon, the defendant, charged with assault with intent to murder,
produced two character witnesses who testified to his reputation as
a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. On cross-examination, the state
asked these witnesses if they knew of the defendant's arrests for
154. Id. at 117-18, 163 N.E. at 423.
155. Id.
156. This confusion continued in subsequent decisions by the court. For example, in
People v. Anderson, 337 Ill. 310, 169 N.E. 243 (1929), the defendant's character witnesses were
asked such questions as, "Do you know of your own knowledge whether the defendant...
was in any police trouble prior to this? Do you know whether or not, of your own knowledge
at that time, whether or not he was in trouble?" Again the court failed to comment on the
form of these questions, and made no mention of Willy or its statement approving crossexamination directed at the witness's familiarity with rumors. Furthermore, the court confused witness impeachment with cross-examination of the witness respecting the character
of the defendant. Citing Celmars and Aiken, the court held:
The reputation of a witness cannot be impeached by proof of particular acts. It
must be by proving his general reputation, for the particular crime with which he
is charged, to be bad. On cross-examination or in rebuttal of proof of good character
particular acts of misconduct may not be shown.
Id. at 332, 169 N.E. at 251. This litany was repeated several years later in 1937 in People v.
Page, 365 II1. 524, 6 N.E.2d 845 (1937). This time, however, the defendant's character witnesses were asked if they had heard of defendant being arrested. Again the court failed to
discuss either the form of the question or the Willy case.
157. 381 Ill. 206, 44 N.E.2d 923 (1942).
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disorderly conduct and for running a gambling house. The court
stated that, under existing Illinois precedent, such crossexamination should not be permitted. It recognized that the majority rule permitted cross-examination directed at rumors of particular acts, and observed that this practice differed sharply from the
improper inquiry directed at personal knowledge. In addition, the
court noted that it was particularly objectionable to cross-examine
concerning irrelevant acts of misconduct. Here, the questions asked
of the defendant's character witnesses on cross-examination had
assumed that the defendant had been arrested more than once for
disorderly conduct and had operated a gambling house. The court
reversed the defendant's conviction based on the fact that the witnesses were not questioned about rumors of the defendant's misconduct, but were interrogated as to their own knowledge of such assumed misconduct. The court emphasized that while in many jurisdictions character witnesses may be cross-examined as to rumors or
reports of specific acts generically related to the trait in issue, in
this instance the prosecution had questioned the character witnesses about acts which "were in no way connected with nor
related to the commission of the crime of assault with intent to
murder."" 8
Although the analysis by the Hannon court was superficial in
many respects, 159 the decision implicitly adopts the majority doctrine. Interestingly, the Hannon case was held out to the United
States Supreme Court in Michelson v. United States 611as representing an alternative to the majority practice. The Supreme Court
recognized, however, that there was no perceptible difference between the putative "Illinois Rule" of Hannon and the majority rule
approved in Michelson.'
The Hannon ruling should have resolved any remaining conflicts
in Illinois case law. Unfortunately, this was not to be. In People v.
Stanton,"2 the court handed down a vague opinion which once again
obscured this area. In Stanton, the defendant, charged with the rape
of a twelve-year-old girl, called his former wife as a character witness to testify to his good reputation for chastity. On cross158. Id. at 211-12, 44 N.E.2d at 926.
159. Although the court discussed the problems presented by character witness crossexamination, and mentioned the major Illinois cases dealing with the subject, it failed to
recognize the inconsistencies and misconceptions evident in its early decisions. As noted
above, several of these decisions have sharply divergent holdings. Additionally, many are
based on unsound premises. The Hannon court, however, made no analytical attempt to
harmonize the rationales of such cases as McCarty, Gifford, Aiken, Celmars, or Willy.
160. 335 U.S. 469, 474 n.4, 483 n. 21, 486-87 (1948).
161. Id. at 486-87.
162. 1 Il1. 2d 444, 115 N.E.2d 630 (1953).
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examination she was asked by the prosecutor whether she had told
the police that two other women were pregnant by the defendant;
the witness replied, "No. I didn't say that. Just one woman was
pregnant by him. The other girl did not have sexual intercourse with
him. The other woman was pregnant." The court, reaching back to
the holding in the antiquated Aiken case, held that this line of crossexamination constituted reversible error: "The law is clear that particular acts of misconduct cannot be shown, either on crossexamination or in rebuttal of proof of good character."'' 3
The Stanton holding is perplexing for several reasons. First, the
court revived the obsolete Aiken holding to state that inquiries on
cross-examination into specific bad acts of the defendant were impermissible. In so doing, the court ignored the Hannon decision,
which had implicitly permitted such inquiries if framed in the
"have you heard" form. Although the court recognized that the
question asked by the prosecution should have been excluded, it
failed to analyze why the trial court's decision was wrong. On direct
examination, the character witness had been questioned about the
general reputation of the defendant, not about her personal opinion
or personal knowledge of the defendant's chastity. Thus, the only
proper method of cross-examination would have been to ask the
witness whether she had heard of rumors or acts inconsistent with
her reputation testimony. For example, it would have been proper
for the prosecution to have asked the witness, "Have you heard that
two other women were pregnant by the defendant?" At that point,
if the witness had said no, it would have been proper to impeach
her with the prior inconsistent statement she had made to the police. However, the prosecution failed to do this. Instead, the question that the prosecution had asked attempted to impeach the witness on a point to which she had not testified-her personal knowledge. The question was premature, and since it referred to specific
bad acts of the defendant, clearly it was impermissible. By reversing
the defendant's conviction, the court reached the correct result, but
for the wrong reasons. In this case, the court thus reinstated the rule
which prohibits inquiries about specific bad acts on crossexamination.
In People v. Greeley,164 however, the court returned once again to
the rule it had promulgated in Willy and Hannon. There, the defendant, sixty-one years old, was charged with the statutory rape of a
fifteen-year-old girl. Eight witnesses testified as to defendant's good
163.
164.

Id. at 446, 115 N.E.2d at 631.
14 IlM.2d 428, 152 N.E.2d 825 (1958).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 10

reputation in the community for chastity and morality. On crossexamination, seven of the eight were asked whether they could state
under oath that the defendant did not have sexual intercourse with
the prosecutrix on the date in question. Five of the witnesses were
also asked whether their opinion would have changed had they
known the charges to be true.
The court, in reversing the defendant's conviction, held that this
cross-examination was impermissible; the prosecution's questions
were improper because they were directed at the witness's own
knowledge and also because they encompassed the ultimate issue in
the case. The court, citing People v. Willy,"' approved the majority
position, stating that such cross-examination must be confined to
disparaging rumors and conversations the witnesses had heard in
the community. 6'
Greeley represents the last authoritative Illinois Supreme Court
decision regarding cross-examination of character witnesses. As
such, it places Illinois in accord with the majority of jurisdictions
which have dealt with this issue.'
Effect of ProposedIllinois Rule 405
Simply stated, proposed rule 405168 allows inquiries into rumors or
reports of specific instances of relevant conduct on crossexamination of a character witness. The rule codifies the holding of
the Illinois Supreme Court in Greeley and Willy, and the United
States Supreme Court in Michelson. The rule would thus end, once
and for all, the confusion that has been created in this area by the
Illinois Supreme Court.
Rule 405, however, is deficient in that it would continue the unrealistic ban on opinion evidence. Clearly, once a cross-examiner is
allowed to ask about particular relevant acts there is no real difference between the questions "have you heard" and "do you know."
165. 301 Il. 307, 133 N.E. 859 (1921).
166. People v. Greeley, 14 Il. 2d 428, 432, 152 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1958).
167. People v. Dorn, 46 Ill. App. 3d 820, 361 N.E.2d 353 (1977). This case holds:
Where evidence of a person's character is introduced at a trial, such evidence is
confined to proof of that person's general reputation. This general reputation is not
established by the personal knowledge of the witness but by what some relevant
social group (e.g., people in the community), as a whole, thinks of the person. For
that reason, it is improper to cross-examine a character witness as to the witness'
own knowledge of particular acts of misconduct on the part of the person whose
character is being testified about. Such cross-examination is limited to disparaging
rumors and conversations which the witness has heard in the community.
46 I11.App. 3d at 823, 361 N.E.2d at 355-56 (citations omitted).
168. See note 39 supra for the text of rule 405.
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It should be noted that this entire line of inquiry is one that is
particularly subject to a relevancy analysis and thus to the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, where that discretion is well exercised, there is little danger that allowing opinion testimony will turn
the trial into a swearing contest between the parties and their witnesses."'
CONCLUSION

The rules and procedures governing the use and presentation of
character evidence are an important aspect of nearly all trials. This
is particularly true in criminal cases. The general exclusionary rule
which prevents the prosecution from introducing evidence of the
past misdeeds of a criminal defendant to imply circumstantially
that the defendant acted in accordance with a particular trait is a
sound one. The rule is premised on the policy that irrelevant past
bad acts by the defendant should not influence the determination
of guilt or innocence in the case before the jury. The defendant
should not be prejudiced by having to defend his entire past life
when there is only one charge properly at issue.
The exception to the general exclusionary rule which allows the
criminal defendant to "open the door" to evidence of his character
is also well founded. A defendant, particularly one who has previously led a blameless life, should be afforded every opportunity to
raise reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury members. Favorable
evidence offered by the defendant may not include specific acts, but
generally is confined to evidence of the defendant's reputation for
the particular trait in issue. The Federal Rules of Evidence, and
several state jurisdictions, permit this evidence to be presented by
personal opinion testimony as well as reputation testimony. However, Illinois common law, and the proposed Illinois Rules of Evidence, continue the traditional common law ban on personal opinion testimony. This prohibition is outmoded and unrealistic and
should be abandoned.
The initial advantage provided the defendant is sharply offset by
the rebuttal methods available to the prosecution. Although the
means by which the defendant is allowed to introduce character
evidence are carefully circumscribed, the prosecution's response is
169. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 20, § 149 at 183. Louisell & Mueller consider
opinion testimony to have great potential, especially in opening up the character field to
expert psychiatric testimony about the defendant. See also Advisory Committee Note to
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 405; Green, Highlights of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 4 GA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed
Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944).
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not so limited. Besides calling rebuttal witnesses to contradict the
prior reputation testimony, the prosecution may also cross-examine
the defendant's character witnesses concerning specific prior bad
acts inconsistent with their favorable testimony. The prosecution
thus effectively "backdoors" the exclusionary policy by eliciting
information the general rule was designed to prohibit-evidence
which is guaranteed to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the
jury.
Although allowing this weapon to the prosecution may at first
appear to unfairly favor the prosecution, on close examination this
process is not as illogical as it may seem. The practical effect of the
threat of cross-examination concerning prior bad acts is probably to
prevent the defendant with a vulnerable background from opening
this area of inquiry, since such a defendant would not wish to risk
exposing himself to such a devastating counterattack. Conversely,
a defendant with an unblemished record probably would utilize the
exclusionary rule exception to initiate character evidence. Thus, the
present system strikes a fair balance by discouraging the use of
character evidence in situations where there is little to be gained
from such evidence and by encouraging it in circumstances where
it may serve a justifiable and beneficial purpose.
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